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House of Lords reform 
 
 
1 Setting up a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom 
1. The Government announced on 12 June that it intended to consult on 
the establishment of a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom. 
This is part of its continuing drive to modernise the constitution and 
public services. The intention is that the new Court will put the 
relationship between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
on a modern footing, which takes account of people's expectations 
about the independence and transparency of the judicial system. There 
have been a number of calls for such a change in recent years, for 
example by the Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in his 
Constitution Unit Lecture in May 2002, in which he said "Our object is 
plain enough: to ensure that our supreme court is so structured and 
equipped as best to fulfil its functions and to command the confidence 
of the country in the changed world in which we live". The Chairman of 
the Bar Council, in an article in The Times on 2 April 2003, said "Judges 
should have no part of the legislature .... It is very difficult to 
understand why our Supreme Court (the law lords) should be a 
committee of the second house of Parliament". 
Why change? 
2. The functions of the highest courts in the land are presently divided 
between two bodies. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
receives appeals from the courts in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland, and in civil cases from Scotland. The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, in addition to its overseas and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
considers questions as to whether the devolved administrations, the 
Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern 
Ireland Assembly are acting within their legal powers. Both sets of 
functions raise questions about whether there is any longer sufficient 
transparency of independence from the executive and the legislature 
to give people the assurance to which they are entitled about the 
independence of the judiciary. The considerable growth of judicial 
review in recent years has inevitably brought the judges more into the 
political eye. It is essential that our systems do all that they can to 
minimise the danger that judges' decisions could be perceived to be 
politically motivated. The Human Rights Act 1998, itself the product of 
a changing climate of opinion, has made people more sensitive to the 
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issues and more aware of the anomaly of the position whereby the 
highest court of appeal is situated within one of the chambers of 
Parliament.  
3. It is not always understood that the decisions of the 'House of Lords' are 
in practice decisions of the Appellate Committee and that non-judicial 
members of the House never take part in the judgments. Nor is the 
extent to which the Law Lords themselves have decided to refrain from 
getting involved in political issues in relation to legislation on which 
they might later have to adjudicate always appreciated. The fact that 
the Lord Chancellor, as the Head of the Judiciary, was entitled to sit in 
the Appellate and Judicial Committees and did so as Chairman, added 
to the perception that their independence might be compromised by 
the arrangements. The Human Rights Act, specifically in relation to 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, now requires a 
stricter view to be taken not only of anything which might undermine 
the independence or impartiality of a judicial tribunal, but even of 
anything which might appear to do so. So the fact that the Law Lords 
are a Committee of the House of Lords can raise issues about the 
appearance of independence from the legislature. Looking at it from 
the other way round, the requirement for the appearance of 
impartiality and independence also increasingly limits the ability of the 
Law Lords to contribute to the work of the House of Lords, thus 
reducing the value to both them and the House of their membership.  
4. The position of the Appellate Committee as part of the House of Lords 
has inevitably limited the resources that can be made available to it. 
Space within the Palace of Westminster is at a premium, especially at 
the House of Lords end of the building. Although the facilities for 
hearings in Committee rooms 1 and 2 are good, the Law Lords' 
administration works in cramped conditions: one law lord does not even 
have a room. The position in the Palace cannot be improved without 
asking other peers to give up their desks. A separately constituted 
Supreme Court suitably accommodated could ensure that these issues 
were properly addressed.  
5. In proposing that the time has come to change these arrangements, no 
criticism is intended of the way in which the members of either 
Committee have discharged their functions. Nor have there been any 
accusations of actual bias in either the appointments to either body or 
their judgments arising from their membership of the legislature. The 
arrangements have served us well in the past. Nonetheless, the 
Government has come to the conclusion that the present position is no 
longer sustainable. The time has come for the UK's highest court to 
move out from under the shadow of the legislature. 
6. The Lord Chancellor has had an important role in preserving judicial 
independence. The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs will 
have a continuing responsibility for this vital safeguard. He will, both 
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within Government and publicly, be responsible for defending judicial 
independence from any attack. As noted in the consultation paper 
Constitutional Reform : A New Way of Appointing Judges, consideration 
should be given to whether that responsibility should be embodied in 
statute setting up the proposed new Judicial Appointments 
Commission.  
7. The Government believes that the establishment of a separate Supreme 
Court will be an important part of a package of measures which will 
redraw the relationship between the Judiciary, the Government, and 
Parliament to preserve and increase our judges' independence.  
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